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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing is emerging as the next disruptive utility paradigm [1]. It provides 
extensive storage capabilities and an environment for application developers through 
virtual machines. It is also the home of software and databases that are accessible, on-
demand.  Cloud computing has drastically transformed the way organizations, and 
individual consumers access and interact with Information Technology. Despite significant 
advancements in this technology, concerns about security are holding back businesses from 
fully adopting this promising information technology trend. 
Third-party auditors (TPAs) are becoming more common in cloud computing 
implementations. Hence, involving auditors comes with its issues such as trust and 
processing overhead. To achieve productive auditing, we need to (1) accomplish efficient 
auditing without requesting the data location or introducing processing overhead to the 
cloud client; (2) avoid introducing new security vulnerabilities during the auditing process. 
There are various security models for safeguarding the CCs (Cloud Client) data in 
the cloud. The TPA systematically examines the evidence of compliance with established 
security criteria in the connection between the CC and the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). 
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The CSP provides the clients with cloud storage, access to a database coupled with 
services. Many security models have been elaborated to make the TPA more reliable so 
that the clients can trust the third-party auditor with their data. 
Our study shows that involving a TPA might come with its shortcomings, such as 
trust concerns, extra overhead, security, and data manipulation breaches; as well as 
additional processing, which leads to the conclusion that a lightweight and secure protocol 
is paramount to the solution. As defined in [2] privacy-preserving is making sure that the 
three cloud stakeholders are not involved in any malicious activities coming from insiders 
at the CSP level, making sure to remediate to TPA vulnerabilities and that the CC is not 
deceitfully affecting other clients. 
In our survey phase, we have put into perspective the privacy-preserving solutions 
as they fit the lightweight requirements in terms of processing and communication costs, 
ending up by choosing the most prominent ones to compare with them our simulation 
results.  In this dissertation, we introduce a novel method that can detect a dishonest TPA: 
The Light-weight Accountable Privacy-Preserving (LAPP) Protocol. The lightweight 
characteristic has been proven simulations as the minor impact of our protocol in terms of 
processing and communication costs. This protocol determines the malicious behavior of 
the TPA. To validate our proposed protocol’s effectiveness, we have conducted simulation 
experiments by using the GreenCloud simulator. Based on our simulation results, we 
confirm that our proposed model provides better outcomes as compared to the other known 
contending methods.  
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The term cloud refers to the storing of data anywhere and accessing it anytime. Only the 
users who have sufficient and required permissions can access the stored data. There are many 
characteristics associated with the cloud, as defined in [3].  
We can also define cloud computing as accessing data and utilizing the required 
applications from remote servers instead of storing or having data locally, which could require a 
considerable amount of storage and resources. Thus, many companies, organizations, and anyone 
who is possessing a substantial amount of data, that needs a scalable environment, can store it in 
the cloud and can access it from anywhere. Cloud computing is Internet-based computing.  
Networking threats have been modelized in the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Confidentiality) - AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) security framework. 
Authentication consists of making sure that the communicating parties are who they pretend 
they are, allowing to avoid the man in the middle attacks (MIM). The authorization consists of 
making sure that the communicating parties are authorized to access the resources. As for 
Accounting, is the about holding every networking stakeholder accountable for their acts and 
keeping tracks actions in security logs.  
The CIA scheme will be detailed below: 
• Confidentiality and privacy:  
Confidentiality refers to limit access to protected data to only authorized parties. The 
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threat of having data compromised increases in the cloud. Due to the increased number of parties, 
devices, and applications involved resulting from the increased number of points of access [4]. 
Data confidentiality in the cloud is correlated to user authentication. Protecting a user’s account 
from theft is an instance of a more significant problem of controlling access to objects, including 
memory, devices, software, etc. [5].  
• Integrity: 
By integrity, we mean that our assets (hardware and software) coupled with data, can only 
be modified by authorized parties and in approved ways. Data Integrity [6] refers to protecting 
data from unauthorized deletion, modification, or fabrication [7]. 
• Availability:  
Availability refers to the property of a system being accessible and usable upon demand by 
an authorized entity. System availability includes a system's ability to carry on operations even 
when some authorities misbehave. The system must be able to continue operations even in the 
possibility of a security breach [8]. 
1.1 Cloud Vulnerabilities 
The data on the cloud should be encrypted, which could lead to processing overhead. 
Considering the benefits of cloud computing, various organizations are moving towards cloud-
based IT solutions. However, before starting the journey to the cloud, adopters must consider the 
possible vulnerabilities (Figure 1) that may convert their dreams of enhancing scalability and 
saving management costs into a nightmare of either data loss and misuse [6]. 
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Confidentiality
Integrity 
Availability 
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Figure 1.1. Security Threats 
 
Hence, users must consider the risks involved with cloud adoption.  In the case of third-
party management models, most security problems stem from [9]: loss of control, lack of trust 
(mechanisms), and multi-tenancy. 
Gartner's seven security issues that cloud clients should take into consideration could be 
summarized [10] as privileged user access, regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, 
recovery, investigative support, and long-term viability (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.2. Security Requirements, Vulnerabilities, and Threats 
a. Access Control: 
 
 In Figure 1.2, we are summarizing the security requirements, the vulnerabilities as well as 
the threats in the cloud computing realm. In a multi-tenancy environment, interoperability defects 
could result in breaches into control access which affects authentication and identification. As for 
availability, if the service or data in the cloud is not available, then it complicates the retrieval of 
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data. Policy integration refers to the case of the heterogeneous cloud where different cloud servers 
may have different mechanisms, making security breaches more likely.  Information on public 
clouds is susceptible to data brokers and hackers due to multiple tenancies due to eavesdropping 
software such as Easter eggs [11]. 
b. Collusion Attacks:  
 
Consists of an attack from malicious cloud users who use feedbacks to manipulate trust model 
results. It is called a Collusive malicious feedback attack [12]. It consists of three types: 
• Self-Promoting: consists of promoting a cloud service provider. Malicious cloud users 
enter significant positive feedback. 
• Slandering: to defame a cloud service provider. Malicious cloud users enter Significant 
negative feedback [13]. 
• Occasional Collusion Feedback attack: in this case, the user occasionally enters essential 
positive or negative feedback. It takes time to identify them. 
c. Sybil Attacks:  
 
 A Sybil attack is an attack from cloud users using multiple identities to manipulate test results 
[12]. A malicious cloud user is producing various fake ratings using a minimal value of product 
purchase in less time.  We can classify Sybil attacks in three categories: 
• Self-Promoting: also known as a ballot stuffing attack; where the cloud user adds 
significant positive feedback to promote a CSP. 
• Slandering: it is also known as a bad-mouthing attack. In this case, the cloud user adds 
significant negative feedback to defame a CSP. 
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• Occasional Sybil Feedback attack: the user occasionally enters essential positive or 
negative feedback. We can only identify them within time. In the article, Noor T.H et al. 
[12] proposed a credibility model to detect collusion and Sybil attacks. 
d. On - Off Attack or intoxication Attack 
 
Malicious users behave alternatively in good or bad ways [14]. In other words, the user first 
acts in the right direction; then after a while, the user starts to misbehave after earning trust. These 
types of users are difficult to identify. This vulnerability is also called the dynamic personality of 
peers in the p2p network system [14]. 
e. Discrimination Attacks 
 
When a CSP delivers different qualities of services provided to CCs, it could result in different 
ratings to these providers and impact their trust. Then the group who offered contradictory results 
might be labeled as dishonest [15]. To date, there is no practical solution to mitigate such an attack. 
f. Newcomer or reentry Attack 
 
Consists of the case when the user who previously produced bad behavior reenters with a new 
identity to attack again [15]. It is called newcomer or reentry Attack. By comparing credential 
recodes using location, unique id, we can reduce reentry Attacks. 
1.2 Research Problem and Scope 
  The cloud storage is an easy and flexible platform that allows the Cloud Client (CC) to 
store its confidential data from local computing to the cloud. Nowadays, many CCs store their data 
in the cloud; however, this platform introduces new concerns and security trials.  To overcome 
these concerns, a Third-Party Auditor (TPA) is added to safeguard the confidential data and restore 
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CC’s confidence. However, since the human factor is introduced, and for the sake of building a 
foolproof system, we should expect that the TPA could be dishonest. The TPA could share the 
CC’s confidential information to illegitimate parties to gain financially as well as other benefits. 
Hence, in this dissertation, we introduce a novel model that enables CCs to protect their private 
data from TPAs: Light-weight Accountable Privacy-Preserving (LAPP) protocol. 
1.3 Motivation Behind the Research 
The motivation behind this research is twofold: 
• The importance of cloud computing  
• The importance of security and trust between CSP and CC 
1.3.1 Importance of Cloud Computing  
Cloud computing is promising to become the next Information Technology (IT) trend, taking in 
consideration of: 
• The importance of the CSPs in the industry (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Rackspace, etc. 
as well as the cloud developed by the open-source community.  
• The rapid development of technology. 
Computing services, such as database transactions, storage, software, computing, and 
applications, are delivered to local devices through the Internet. Cloud computing allows resolving 
the under or over-estimation of IT infrastructures’ projections, thus avoiding a long wait for servers 
to be shipped or configured. Or sometimes, to prevent having configured servers sitting idle 
because the team is busy resolving other issues. They are ideal for environments with seasonal 
peaks for over underuse of resources as cloud computing is based on the “pay as you use” principle, 
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and most providers allow the clients to pre-configure how they want to scale their use of cloud 
resources [16]. 
1.3.2 Importance of security and trust between CSP and CC 
Cloud computing uses many technologies and strategies to protect clients’ data. The cloud 
service providers compete on using the latest security schemes. Nonetheless, there are still many 
ambiguities, security-wise, that are making many companies skeptical of adopting the cloud 
concept fully [17]. 
In cloud computing safety, security and privacy of data are very important. Cloud 
computing is vastly used in different social, economic, and national areas of our society. It is used 
in several industries, financial institutions, government offices, educational institutions, etc. So, 
people are storing critical and sometimes very confidential data through cloud computing. Hence, 
before adopting cloud computing, proper knowledge about deployment, security, and privacy 
requirements is required. Many companies, as well as individuals, are still skeptical about cloud 
computing when considering the security vulnerabilities associated with it. There are yet no 
specified privacy and security protection laws explicitly created for cloud computing [18] [19]. 
Many researchers are focusing on identifying the security and privacy issues which can be 
faced by cloud computing customers. Another area of research explores how to select trustable 
and suitable cloud providers to minimize security and privacy risks [20] [21].  
1.4 Potential Contribution of the Proposed Research:  
 
As cloud computing is emerging as the next utility service based on pay as you use model, 
cloud clients could benefit from the financial savings if they deploy to the cloud correctly. 
However, security vulnerabilities are the main factor in holding back many companies from even 
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considering the cloud. Involving a TPA could increase the willingness for adoption. However, it 
comes with its own set of issues. 
The third-party auditor is assumed to be trusted to assess the CSP’s storage security upon 
request from the CC and the provider (Figure1.3). This scheme gives explicit data support and uses 
correcting code to provide redundancy in preparation for file distribution.  
 
Figure 1.3. Cloud Computing Based on TPA Diagram 
 Nonetheless, adding a TPA comes with its issues, namely processing overhead (as well as 
data redundancy) and security trust (tampering with the CC’s data). In this dissertation, we are 
proposing LAPP, a novel security model allowing the CC to audit the auditor, by validating the 
key presented by the TPA when initiating the audit process, as well as detecting any malicious 
activity of the TPA and the CSP.  It also allows us to ensure that the three stakeholders (CC, CSP, 
and the TPA) are using the same keys as issued by the trusted party.  
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The potential contributions of this proposed model are: 
• A recapitulation of state of the art for security methods in cloud computing based on a 
TPA: we have surveyed and classified around hundred and fifty recent papers on cloud 
security based on a TPA. 
• Our proposed LAPP allows the CC to audit the TPA and the CSP for malicious activities, 
which increases the confidence and the willingness of more companies to embrace the 
cloud realm. 
• On the other hand, once embraced the cloud, LAPP is situated to increase trust and grants 
more control to the CC to detect issues timely to take practical actions. 
o Ensuring minimum overhead while successfully issuing the secret key to the three 
stakeholders (CSP, CC, and TPA). 
o Determining and avoiding the malicious role of the TPA, if any, with a lightweight 
and straightforward algorithm. 
o Enforcing the trust between the TPA and the CC by introducing a malicious-
detection algorithm that enables both parties to keep a check and balance on each 
other.  
o Assuring a more secure communication at a minimum communication-cost. 
o Accurately detecting malicious activities. 
o Improving the Quality-of-Service (QoS) provision, our time complexity simulation 
results were of a paramount significance in determining this factor. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY – SECURITY IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING BASED ON A TPA 
2.1 Classification of the Security Methods Based on a TPA 
 
Figure 2.1 depicts the classification of the studied methods based on their adopted algorithms. 
 
Figure 2.1. TPA Classification based on adopted algorithms 
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2.2 Taxonomy of the Surveyed Methods 
 
2.2.1 Based on Privacy-Preserving Model (PPM) 
2.2.1.1 Security and Privacy for Storage (SPS): 
 
“Secure Public Auditing Cloud Storage Enabling Data Dynamics in the Standard Model” [22]. 
SPS is a proposed protocol to audit and protect the data’s integrity using the RSA’s assumptions as 
a base then extending it to enable a TPA to audit the user’s data without being able to learn its 
contents. It also allows supporting the operations of data dynamics, such as “insertion,” 
“modification,” and “deletion.”. In [22], the user has a substantial amount of data to store, the CSP 
has the means to store all this data at an economical price, and the TPA is proficient in providing 
auditing that is unbiased and efficient. The authors assume that the CSP is to be untrusted for the 
reasons discussed before. The TPA’s services are needed to allow the CC to gain trust in the CSPs. 
The TPA is to be trusted, but it is also assumed that it could be curious, and it could be dangerous 
if it could learn any of the sensitive information in the data outsourced [23]. The protocol starts with 
the CC encrypting the data to be outsourced using as a base the strong RSA assumption.  
 From there, the auditing starts, and it is composed of five algorithms:  
• “KeyGen”: used by the CC to create a public key and a secret one. “Outsource”: used by the CC 
to send the processed data to the CSP. “Audit”: used by the TPA to create an audit query to 
submit to the CSP.  
• “Prove”: used by the CSP after receiving as input the audit query from the TPA and creates a 
proof by using the data stored.  
• “Verify”: used by the TPA to receive the proof from the CSP to check, using the public key, if 
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the evidence is correct. 
The performance analysis has been divided into two parts, the communication, and the 
computation cost. The communication cost consists of the interaction between the CSP and the 
TPA. It is based on the proof provided by the CSP to the TPA.  
The computation cost for the TPA is determined by the time it takes to audit and verify the data, 
which is supposed to be fast. For the CSP, it is determined by the time it takes to prove to possess 
the data, which is determined by the block size, how long the audit query is, and how long it takes 
to create the information to authenticate[24]. 
2.2.1.2 PANDA Public Auditing (PPA) 
 
“Public Auditing for Secure Data Storage in Cloud through a Third Party Auditor Using 
Modern Ciphertext” [25] proposes a scheme of auditing, using cipher cryptography instead of 
encryption for the communication with the third-party auditor. The paper focuses on data integrity 
and storage.  
In this method, the TPA performs audits without the need for copies of the outsourced data. 
The scheme consists of five algorithms.  
The CC has to use the new ciphertext to encrypt the data to be outsourced.  Then the 
auditing process begins, using five algorithms:  
• "KeyGen," that is used by the CC and the TPA to generate keys. 
• "SigGen," that the TPA runs to create the verification metadata. 
• "GenProof," that is used by the CSP to check if the data is correctly stored and create a proof 
of its state; and "VerifyProof" that the TPA uses to test the evidence given by the CSP and 
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verify its correctness.  
During the setup phase, these algorithms are applied as follows, after the CC encrypts the 
data, it uses “KeyGen” to generate an owner key, and then sends the key and the processed data to 
the TPA through a private channel. The TPA runs “KeyGen” to create a challenge key and then 
runs “SigGen” to generate the verification key and then encrypts the processed data to make 
crypto-metadata to be sent to the CSP.  
In the auditing phase, the TPA sends a challenge, using the challenge key, to the CSP. Then 
using "GenProof" generates an audit key to the TPA, which then uses "VerifyProof" to check if 
the audit key is equal to the verification key allowing to verify the integrity of the stored data [17]. 
The system performance analysis is divided into computational, communication, and 
storage costs. The aim of the computational is to achieve low complexity.  Compared with other 
models with the same scheme, it uses the advanced encryption standard on a bilinear map. In the 
communication cost, the goal is to have the length of the auditing requests shorter than the length 
of those in the other schemes based on the bilinear map protocol. Finally, in the storage cost, it is 
also compared to other methods based on the bilinear map protocol [25]. 
2.2.1.3 Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing (PPPAS) 
 
“Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for Secure Cloud Storage” (PPPAS) [26], is the oldest one 
of the batch and is alleging to be one of the pioneers to implement public auditing that preserves 
the data’s privacy in the cloud using the “homomorphic linear authenticator” (HLA) [24, 27]. The 
HLA is based on keys. This technique allows us to audit without having to use a local copy of the 
data and incorporating it with arbitrary masking.  
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This method aims to make the TPA unable to learn the audited data’s contents. This scheme uses 
the same four algorithms as the previous protocol used as well (“KeyGen,” “SigGen,” “GenProof,” 
and “VerifyProof”). The performance of their auditing is shown to be on par with the state-of-the-
art, with a warranty of privacy-preserving [28].  
2.2.1.4 Secure and Efficient Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing (SEPPPA) Protocol: 
“Secure and efficient privacy-preserving public auditing scheme for cloud storage”(SEPPPA) 
[29] declares to have an auditing scheme that has the TPA audit without needing the entire data, 
maintaining its privacy and integrity, as well as being able to audit by batches. It uses a bilinear 
map to encrypt the data [30]. This scheme uses four algorithms as well: “KeyGen” that the CC 
uses to create a pair of keys, one public, available to all the auditing participants, but only 
authorized TPAs can use it to audit, and a private key for the CC. “SigGen” that creates signatures 
for all the outsourced files. “ProofGen” is run by the CSP when challenged and uses the data to 
develop a proof of its integrity. “VerifyProof” is used to check the integrity of the data using the 
evidence provided by the CSP and the public key, and is run by the TPA [31]. The performance 
of the scheme was categorized as increasing communication and computation overhead. In the 
former, the authors explain that data outsourcing, challenge-response auditing, and data retrieval 
are the main reasons for complexity in the message exchange [32]. It is considered that the 
outsourcing and retrieval overhead is inevitable, so they focus on the challenge-response, to which 
they concluded that the system’s complexity is constant [33]. 
2.2.1.5 Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for shared Cloud Data: 
In this method [34] the integrity of the shared data can be audited by the TPA without the 
need for the entire data stored in the cloud. The public verifier does not learn the group member’s 
private identity information. 
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The performance is measured on dynamic groups as well as the public auditing. In active 
groups, once there is a new user in the group, the private key is shared with him by the original 
user. Re-signing is done on all the block once the user is revoked from the group; it avoids him to 
download all the shared data again. In public auditing, the integrity of the information is audited, 
and the identities of the signers in dynamic groups are preserved. Encryption is done by active 
broadcast to distribute the private key to the active group members securely. Proxy signatures are 
needed when the users are revoked, and new users need to be added. In this method, TPA 
Consumes more time and bandwidth to achieve high error detection probability. The main 
advantage of this method is dynamic group efficiency is high. 
In [35], a bilinear aggregate signature technique is utilized to enable the TPA to handle 
multiple auditing tasks. This method overcomes the issue of the remote integrity check for data 
dynamics and simultaneous public auditability. This technique uses the Merkle hash tree 
algorithm, and batch auditing for multi-client data is done using the BLS signature scheme. This 
scheme gives a solution that provisions public auditability and’ data dynamics. There are some 
steps that are carried out at the server-side and the client-side by the TPA, which are generating 
the keys and proof checking the keys. By invoking KeyGen, clients' public and private keys are 
generated. A data file denoted as F is pre-processed by running SigGen. Homomorphic 
authenticators and metadata are also produced.     
2.2.1.6 Third-Party Auditor: A Potential Solution for Securing a Cloud Environment 
Another scheme is proposed in [36], to detect the malicious insiders in the cloud. It also 
prevents the number of malicious attempts in the cloud. The performance of this scheme is 
evaluated based on the successful prevention of malicious access attempts. 
2.2.2 Cloud Data Integrity Using a Designated Public Verifier: 
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The authors use a public verifier in their auditing process to provide data confidentiality and 
integrity. The system model has three entities: Cloud Service User, Cloud Service Provider, and a 
designated public verifier [37].  
 Cloud Service Provider performs computation services based on user’s requirements. All 
the channels perform point to point communication using secure socket layers. It ensures the data 
privacy of cloud users. This scheme is based on Privacy-Preserving Model, which does the 
auditing process. The disadvantage of this scheme is when the number of users in the cloud 
increases, it will affect the TPA’s efficiency. This reduction is due while performing auditing there 
will be an increase in the number of malicious users. 
2.2.2.1 Based on Homomorphic Non-linear Authenticator: 
 
 Data Possession Scheme 
 
The authors developed an attributed based provable data possession scheme to check the 
data integrity in cloud computing storage, [38]. It utilizes the attributed based signature to construct 
a homomorphic authenticator. This scheme consists of three different networks which are a client, 
Cloud Storage Server, and Third-Party Auditor. The Cloud Storage Server used in this scheme is 
stateless and is verifier independent. In this method, a homomorphic authenticator contains some 
attributed strategy. The person who satisfies the policy can check data integrity. The delegation 
key generated by the data owner can fail in subsequent work. The third-party auditor can act as a 
verifier of the data if it has the public key, and the server cannot be trusted in this case. Clients 
interact with the servers for accessing the applications. This method consists of cyclic groups 
which form the signature scheme for the user. The computation becomes hard in bilinear groups, 
and it is difficult for the adversary to have correctly computed values.  The main advantage of this 
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scheme consists of strong anonymity and sound resistance. It is also able to unlink. The main 
disadvantage of this method is that the third-party auditor should be trustworthy or else the client’s 
data will be susceptible to compromise [39] [40]. 
2.2.2.2 Based on Proxy Re-signature Scheme: 
 
Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing in Cloud Storage Security 
 
For securing the user’s cloud storage such that the TPA cannot learn any information, a 
method was developed in [41] which uses a homomorphic non-linear authenticator, and the 
random masking guarantees that the TPA cannot acquire any information while auditing. Random 
masking is done in non-linear blocks in the server’s response because of this; the TPA cannot 
determine the user’s data. This method utilizes short signature scheme [42], which is used for 
auditing protocol and public auditing. The design goals of this method are public audit, storage 
consistency, privacy-preserving, batch auditing, and lightweight. The proposed module consists of 
three algorithms: 
• Algorithm 1 is used for token pre-computation. 
• Algorithm 2 is used for accuracy, verification, and for locating errors. 
• Algorithm 3 is used for error recovery. 
They base their method on security consistency for batch auditing, which is needed for 
storage correctness and preserving privacy. 
2.2.3 Based on Elaborated Key Exchange Algorithm 
2.2.3.1 Based on RSA 
a. RSA based Storage Security 
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The RSASS method consists of two phases [43]: a setup phase and the integrity phase.  
This scheme consists of continually monitoring and is mainly based on the PDP scheme. Their 
primary purpose is to achieve storage correctness. It supports dynamic operation and identifies 
misbehaving servers. It generates a signature that can be used for a file with large and variable 
sizes. Also, the possession of the records is verified by frequently checking the integrity of the 
shared data. This method can be incorporated in real-time, and data storage security can be 
effectively improved [44] [45]. 
b. Novel third Party Auditor Scheme 
 
This scheme involves two sections [46], the first section relates to the interaction between 
the cloud server(s) and the user and the second section refers to the communication between the 
organization’s server and the cloud server [47].  
System setup: in this step, the user sends a request to the cloud server to store the data files. 
The file creates and stores unique keys for the user while at the same time sending keys of itself to 
the user. 
New data file packet: in this step, the user first reformats the data file and encrypts it with 
a secret key before sending it. 
Data file stored: after the user sends the data, the storage server searches for its unique 
identification in the cloud. 
The second section relating to the second phase of interactions between the organization’s 
server and the cloud server involves the following steps: 
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• System setup: this step relates to the identification between the cloud and the organization 
servers. Storage servers can then identify each other via this unique identifier in the cloud. 
• Keys and other information exchanges: when an information change is made on either set 
of servers, they should exchange information with the other servers. For example, 
whenever a cloud server changes a key, it should inform the organization’s servers. 
2.2.3.2 Based on Diffie-Hellman: 
 Data Privacy by Authenticating and Secret Sharing(PASS) 
 Protecting data privacy and security can also be done through secret sharing. PASS (data 
Privacy by Authentication and Secret Sharing) adopts public key cryptosystem that increases 
the transmission cost and will not store the secret key. Only if the client device is compromised, 
the secret key may be compromised. Secure Cloud Computing (SCC) is designed using 
Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and symmetric bivariate polynomial based secret 
sharing to mitigate this issue,  [48] [49]. 
• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH): this is key protocol based on the elliptic curve 
discrete algorithm. ECHD is faster than the multiplicative group algorithm. 
• Symmetric bivariate polynomial based sharing: there are two types of sharing: one is 
symmetric, and the other is an asymmetric-based sharing. However, the symmetric 
bivariate based sharing is used to adapt its informative feature of symmetric property to 
design SCC.  
The authors propose two types of SCC. One requires a TPA, and the other does not. Then 
they could extend this type of SCC to Multi-serve SCC (MSCC). The key agreement 
protocol without the TPA has three phases: the key sharing phase, the mutual 
authentication phase, and the key recovery phase. The key agreement protocol with TPA 
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is the same as without TPA except for the key sharing phase. The main security features 
that can be achieved using the proposed SCC are mutual authentication between client and 
server. 
On the other hand, the client does not need a complex public cryptosystem to send the 
share to the cloud server. Even if the client-server and local client devices are 
compromised, the secret key cannot be obtained. By adding the symmetric property in 
secret sharing, it reduces the cost to share information between the client and the server 
[50]. 
2.2.4 Based on Proof of Retrievability 
2.2.4.1 Proof of Ownership and Retrievability (PoOR) using homomorphic Verifiable 
Tags 
 
The elimination of duplicate information (deduplication) and evidence of information 
retrievability in cloud capacity under the setting that both customer and cloud servers are not fully 
trusted, which is an issue that must be addressed. The authors introduced a scheme [51] called 
Proofs of Ownership and Retrievability (PoOR) [52] to remediate this issue. In this plan, the 
customers need to prove their ownership of the records they need to transfer without, indeed 
exchanging the documents to the servers. The cloud computing concept could be compared with 
Cluster Computing and Grid Computing. In clusters, the resources are grouped into a single 
administrative domain, and in the grid systems, the resources are geographically distributed across 
multiple administrative areas. In this scenario, four relevant entities are involved, namely 
Users/Brokers, SLA Resource Allocator, Virtual Machines (VM’s), and Physical Machines.  
Cloud computation has drawn broad consideration from both academic and industry levels. By 
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adding a bunch of existing and new strategies like Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA) and 
virtualization, consisting of: 
• Achieving fine-graininess, scalability and data confidentiality 
• Empowering the data manager to delegate most computation heavy assignments to 
cloud servers without client access benefit data  
• Securing under standard models 
To attain secure, scalable and fine-grained access control on outsourced information in the 
cloud, the authors combined three cryptographic techniques: Key Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (KP-ABE), Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) and lazy re-encryption. In KP-ABE, 
information is related to qualities; for each one of them, they characterize an open key segment 
[53] [54]. 
2.2.4.2 Optimized Proof of Retrievability Scheme 
 
A new scheme called PoOR was proposed [55] with two independent cloud servers. One 
is used for auditing, and other for storage. They decrease the size of the audit server’s capacity. 
The audit server audits the files remotely stored in the cloud storage by considering the reset 
attack against the storage during the upload phase. To ensure remote data integrity, an efficient 
verification scheme that proves secure against reset attacks. The PoOR method supports 
dynamics and imposes heavy computation overhead at the client-side, new. Hence, the users still 
must compute all the tags before uploading. All the above techniques do not take reset attacks 
into account. The construction can reset attacks triggered by the cloud storage server in the 
upload phase and clients for ensuring the integrity of data storage [56] [57]. 
The system architecture based on three different entities: 
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• Client: an entity or organization that has extensive data files to store in the cloud 
•     CSS (Cloud Storage Servers): an entity managed by CSP, and requires cloud audit server 
during the integrity check phase 
• CAS (Cloud Audit Server):  a  TPA having specific expertise and capabilities, and is 
trusted to access services on behalf of the client upon request 
2.2.4.3 Secure Certificateless Private Verification (SCLPV): 
 
This method [58] uses certificate-less verification for the cloud user’s storage. Cyber-Physical 
System (CPS) integrates the cyber world with the physical world, where information is exchanged 
and transformed. Cyber-Physical Social System (CPSS) has a social entity related to it. For public 
verification: it uses the PoR (Proof of Retrievability) technique. The TPA can prove that all the 
verification work successfully. The Key Generation Center (KGC) is controlled by authority and 
trusted by the users [59]. 
The security model consists of public certificate-less verification, security, and efficiency. The 
main advantage of the above method is that a more considerable verification overhead guarantees 
the protection of the data to prevent malicious auditors. The security threats involved in this 
method will lead to higher verification costs, and multiple verification tasks may not be adequately 
performed. 
2.2.5 Based on Erasure Correcting Code 
2.2.5.1 Layered Interleaving Technique: 
The architecture of the technique will be as follows [60] [61]: 
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Third-Party Auditor:  
It should not receive the user’s data content through delegated data auditing. The user sends 
all attributes required for verifying the cloud server in a secure encrypted fashion. 
Cloud Service Provider:  
It contains resources and expertise in building and managing distributed cloud storage 
servers. It owns, operates, and leases the live cloud computing systems. 
Security Analysis: 
Step1: Challenge token creation. When a user stores a file in the cloud, he pre-computes a 
few verification tokens and distributes them to different servers. Then, each server should make a 
signature and re-transmit each back to the user to provide him with a handshaking response for the 
data that the user stored in the cloud storage. 
Step2: Correctness verification: The response value from the servers not only determines 
the correctness of distributed storage but also verifies it with the secure server. 
Step3: Data recovery: in this step, the user checks whether the malicious affected the data 
on the servers. 
2.2.5.2 Privacy Negotiation Language (PNL) based on Description Logic 
Besides the significant cloud services provided to users, the user's confidential information 
is at risk. It is of utmost necessary for preserving privacy [62] and ensuring the correctness [63] of 
the users’ data in cloud systems (CS). Hence, few methods were proposed to mitigate these security 
issues. To negotiate privacy property between the CS and user, Privacy Negotiation Language 
(PNL) based on description logic was developed. This method can effectively protect the user data 
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from being misused and illegally propagated by the service provider. This method is proposed to 
ensure the correctness of users’ stored data, and to protect against Byzantine failure, malicious 
data modification attack, and server colluding attacks. The iterating frequency of algorithm utilized 
is limited yet provides the correct and valid solution. This method supports the Dynamic Data 
Operation [64]. 
There is also the provision of public auditing of stored data in CS. This scheme uses the 
audit report from the TPA, helps the customers to evaluate the risk of their subscribed cloud data 
services.  And for the CSP, to ensure its functionality and face security challenges. 
2.2.6 Feedback Based Audit Scheme 
Securing the Cloud Storage Audit Scheme: 
 
The authors are proposing another scheme that is based on feedback to remediate to the 
limitations of the Third-Party protocols.  
TPAs tend to be semi-trusted or even potentially malicious in some situations. Moreover, a 
TPA may not always be reliable and independent. It may also collude with the CSP to pass the 
verification for hiding some CSP’s corrupted incident [65]. In this paper, the authors propose a 
feedback-based audit scheme allowing users to gain trust in the CSP, as well as allowing it to check 
the integrity of stored data by themselves instead of using the TPA’s services [66]. 
This scheme consists of four phases, which are set up, release plan, execute plan, and review 
plan.  
The TPA has an aggregate-feedback-algorithm, which is required by the user to revoke and 
invoke it. The following aspects should be considered to establish this feedback-based auditing 
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model: the user can authenticate whether any TPA has cheated the date owner or indeed executed 
the designated computational audit task.  
The user’s data privacy is protected against malicious TPAs. Also, the user could revoke the 
malicious TPA via the proposed scheme. The proposed model can prohibit the frame and collude 
attack thoroughly while other existing protocols cannot. So, it is said to be an effective and 
lightweight protocol where the user himself executes the final verification task. The TPA plays the 
role of processing proofs and aggregating feedbacks. Processing proofs are required to process the 
response regarding computing mechanism, and the TPA continuously send the processed data to 
the server at the receiver side. Running time analysis is done to investigate the number of sampled 
blocks added to the effect of the audit plan. In this protocol, the user executes the final verification 
task. So not only relying on the third party gives more reliability but also implements more trust 
as for solely building on the TPA’s services [67]. 
2.2.7 Based on Oruta and Knox Approach 
Secure Digital Signature Scheme: 
 The authors discussed The active adversary attacks in three auditing mechanisms for 
shared data in the cloud, including two identity privacy-preserving auditing mechanisms called 
Oruta and Knox, and a distributed storage integrity auditing mechanism [68] [69].  
It involves the following steps: 
• Analysis of Oruta 
• Analysis of Knox 
• A solution to the security issue 
Information in the cloud storage should be protected. Basically, in cloud storage, users 
store their data using third-party Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The governments used the 
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third-party doctrine as the legal basis for the government’s ease of access to information stored 
by individuals or businesses contracting with third-party ISPs. 
2.2.8 Based on Bi-Linearity Property: 
Third-Party Storage Audit Service 
 
As previously discussed, cloud storage systems’ data owners host their data on cloud 
servers, and this data can be accessed remotely by the data users, resulting in security challenges. 
The authors elaborated on the need for an efficient and secure dynamic protocol to convince users; 
resulting in data correctly stored in the cloud. They propose the use of a Third-party Storage Audit 
Service (TSAS). The TSAS mainly discusses the security challenges that occur in cloud systems 
[70] [71] [24]. 
 The auditing protocol should have the following properties. 
• Confidentiality 
• Dynamic auditing 
• Batch auditing  
And moreover, it should take in consideration the communication and processing costs. 
2.2.9 Based on the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) 
Utilizing Third Party Auditing to manage Trust in the Cloud 
 
This approach to managing trust in the cloud is based on the Consensus Assessments 
Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) [72], it consists of different security domains. Each has several 
security controls along with a varying number of controls. A group called Cloud Service Alliance 
(CSA) designed this questionnaire.  
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The CSA has a validation process depending upon the response received. At the Top-level Security 
Domains (TPSD), the validation process is performed. Also, the TPA has many Security Controls 
Validation (SCV) mechanisms.  Mapping is done between the TPSD and the SCV for the auditing 
process. Based on the cloud services, this method is used to assist the CC in selecting adequate 
CSP. 
2.2.10 Based on Encryption and Secret Key 
A Trusted Third-Party Based Encryption Scheme for Ensuring Data 
Confidentiality in Cloud Environment 
The main idea of this scheme is to provide active encryption key management to improve the 
benefits of cloud computing. The CC utilizes a symmetric key protocol for encrypting the data. 
The TPA maintains a database of secret keys. Shelf protocols are used to provide security to the 
three entities in the cloud environment. 
The TPA module has four steps: Holding the secret key, acquiring the public key certificates, 
Secret key exchange, and verification of the client’s data. By using the encryption scheme, 
according to the authors, we assure data confidentiality and reduce the computational burden [73]. 
For the encryption of data in the cloud, the authors use four algorithms in [74] for ensuring 
cloud data storage security.  
AES (Advanced Encryption Standards): It is a single key algorithm. It uses the same key 
to encrypt and decrypt the data. It has the key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits. This algorithm is 
considered secure. Using the same key reduces the computational load of encryption and 
decryption. This method has a disadvantage of sharing the key with both the CC and the cloud, 
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which could result, in this case, in the compromise of the security of the key, which could result 
in more damage to the system [75]. 
SHA-1: SHA-1 algorithm has a place with a cryptographic family; it produces a twenty-
byte hash. In SHA-1 algorithm message digest length is fixed to160 Bytes. 
This algorithm has high efficiency, but it allows the user to read the data only if one of the 
keys matches the attributes in the given set of keys [76] [77]. 
Apart from these standard encryption techniques, there are two user-defined algorithms which 
are the Correctness Verification and Error Localization algorithm, and the Error Recovery 
algorithm. 
2.2.11 Based on a Centralized Approach 
A Centralized Trust Model Approach for Cloud Computing 
 
      In this approach [78], a trust model is proposed based on a few performance factors. At first, 
the authors start by studying subjective versus objective trust. Then the role of a third-party auditor 
is to rate the cloud service providers and give a score to them based on the services they are 
offering. Also, the feedback of the end-user is needed while providing a rating to the Cloud service 
provider. This process allows maintaining trust between the cloud user and the cloud provider.  
2.3 Recapitulation of the Surveyed Methods 
 
First, we proceed with a recapitulation and a classification of the studied methods as 
shown in Table 2.1, then a recapitulation based on the key schemes as illustrated in Table 2.2. 
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                    Table 2.1 Recapitulation and Classification Table 
 
Security Model Security Requirements Threats   Advantages 
“Secure and 
efficient privacy-
preserving public 
auditing scheme” 
(SPS) [22] 
• Third-party auditing  
• Supports data dynamics 
• Supports privacy-preserving 
public auditing 
• Use of private channels to 
relay information 
• TPA somehow trusted 
• Communication 
overhead 
• Practical for cloud 
systems on large-scale             
• Considers 
vulnerabilities of 
dynamic data 
 
“Public Auditing for 
Secure Data Storage 
in Cloud through a 
Third-Party 
Auditor Using 
Modern Ciphertext” 
(PPA) [25] 
• Third-party auditing        
Supports data dynamics  
• Double block transportation                           
• Supports privacy-preserving 
public auditing 
• TPA used as an 
intermediary to send 
encrypted data 
• Hidden Server Failure   
• Practical for cloud 
systems on large-scale                
• TPA doesn’t need a 
local copy of data            
“Privacy-Preserving 
Public Auditing for 
Secure Cloud 
Storage” (PPPAS) 
[26] 
• Third-Party auditing           
• Supports batch auditing      
• Supports privacy-preserving 
public auditing 
• TPA somehow 
trusted 
• TPA doesn’t need a 
local copy of data 
• Identification of 
Invalid Response 
• Support for Dynamic 
Data 
“Secure and 
Efficient Privacy-
Preserving Public 
Auditing” 
(SEPPPA) [29] 
• Third-Party auditing         
• Supports batch auditing  
• Supports privacy-preserving 
public auditing 
• TPA somehow 
trusted     
• TPA doesn’t need a 
local copy of data           
• To date, a pioneer in 
privacy-preserving 
schemes for cloud 
Privacy-preserving 
Public Auditing for 
Shared Cloud Data 
[34] 
• They use the proxy re-
signature scheme for 
outsourcing the updated 
operations 
• The common private key is 
shared between the group’s 
shared data  
• Encryption is done by 
dynamic broadcast; to 
securely distribute the private 
key  
• TPA consumes more 
time and bandwidth to 
achieve high error 
detection probability 
• Highly efficient 
for progressive 
groups 
• Public 
auditability and 
data are 
compelling for 
the remote data 
integrity check 
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Security Model Security Requirements Threats   Advantages 
 
Securing the cloud 
environment using 
TPA [36] 
• An auditing protocol for 
ensuring the integrity of the 
third-party auditor using the 
time-released session keys 
• It also uses PPM technique 
• It ensures integrity using 
time-bounded session keys 
• The public verifier is no  
trusted 
• Malicious 
insiders and 
attempts are 
reduced 
• Data privacy is 
protected 
 
Designated public 
verifier using PPM 
[37] 
• Data Security scheme is 
utilized for the public verifier 
to audit the data of the cloud 
user 
• It uses Privacy-Preserving 
Model technique 
• The designated public 
verifier is a trusted entity like 
the third-party auditor 
• Multiple auditing is no  
supported 
• Efficiency and 
reliability are 
greatly 
improved 
• Reduced 
computational 
burden  
 
Data Possession 
Scheme [38] 
• An attributed based signature 
is utilized to construct a 
homomorphic authenticator 
to check on data integrity 
• Cloud Storage Server is 
Stateless and verifier 
independent 
• TPA has the public key, and 
it acts as a verifier 
• Cloud Storage Server 
cannot be trusted 
 
• TPA should be 
trustworthy 
• Maintains 
strong 
anonymity in 
the cloud 
environment 
• Good resistance 
Privacy-preserving 
Public Auditing in 
Cloud Storage 
Security [41] 
• Using homomorphic non-
linear authenticator and 
random masking technique 
• Security consistency is 
required for batch auditing to 
secure the correctness of the 
stored data 
• Uses the short signature 
scheme for the auditing 
protocol and the public 
auditing 
• A local copy of the dat  
can be present in the 
TPA 
 
• Secures the 
User’s 
outsourced data 
in the cloud 
• TPA achieves 
better efficiency 
while 
performing 
multiple 
auditing tasks 
 
RSA based Storage 
Security (RSASS) 
[43] 
• RSA algorithm is used to 
generate the signature for 
handling large data files 
• Mainly based on Provable 
Data Possession scheme to 
achieve storage correctness 
• Security is constantly 
maintained  
• Generates signature which 
can be used for files of large 
and different sizes 
• TPA has the private 
key which may be 
unsafe 
 
• Supports the 
dynamic 
operation and 
identifies 
misbehaving 
servers in the 
cloud. 
• Dramatically 
improves data 
storage security 
in cloud 
computing 
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Security Model Security Requirements Threats   Advantages 
 
Novel Third-Party 
Auditor Scheme [46] 
• RSA: used for encryption 
algorithm and Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman: used to secure the 
keys while exchanging them  
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman is the 
proper method to interchange 
keys which allows two 
entities to share secret keys 
without any prior knowledge 
• Data storage 
security 
• Reduce of 
computing 
complexity 
• Assures 
confidentiality 
• Authentication is 
secured 
• Unauthorized 
access is 
restricted 
 
 
Data Privacy by 
Authenticating and 
Secret Sharing 
(PASS) [50] 
• SCC (Secure Cloud 
Computing) is designed using 
Elliptical curve Diffie-
Hellman and symmetric 
bivariate polynomial based 
secret sharing 
• Two types of SCC: One 
requiring TPA and the other 
does not require it 
• TPA is assumed, to 
be honest in SCC. 
• Cloud Server cannot 
send the server’s 
share to the client. 
• PASS ensures 
mutual 
authentication 
between the 
client and the 
server. 
• Reduce if 
information cost 
in secret sharing. 
• Allows to 
establish multi-
Serve SCC  
Proofs of 
Ownership and 
Retrievability 
(PoOR) [51] 
• P0OR uses erasure code, 
Merkle tree, and 
homomorphic verifiable tags 
• Assuring efficiency analysis 
with the help of data size, 
computation complexity, size 
of metadata and 
communication cost 
• Data duplication is a 
problem which increases 
data redundancy 
• Satisfies the 
requirements of 
the cloud 
environment  
• Optimized traffic 
cost 
• Computation 
performance is 
relatively 
satisfactory 
 
Proof of 
Retrievability 
Scheme (PoR) [55]  
• The different entities present 
in this scheme are the Client, 
Cloud Storage Server, and 
Cloud Audit Server 
• Remotely filed stored are 
audited by using a cloud 
server that is independent of 
the storage server 
•  Reset attacks occur 
during the upload 
phase against storage 
• Significantly 
reduced 
computation 
overhead 
• Both dynamic 
data operation 
and public 
verifiability are 
supported 
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Security Model Security Requirements Threats   Advantages 
 
Secure Certificate-
less public 
verification [58] 
• Uses Proof of Retrievability 
technique for public 
verification 
• Consists on public 
certificate-less verification, 
security, and efficiency 
 
• More verification 
cost is needed 
• Performs multiple 
verification tasks  
• A malicious 
auditor user 
cannot impact 
the security of 
SCLPV 
• Significant 
verification 
overhead 
guarantees the 
protection of the 
data 
 
 
Layered 
Interleaving 
Technique [60]  
• Erasure correcting code to 
tolerate multiple failures 
• TPA delegates the task of 
verification to save time on 
the user’s side 
• Based on token challenge 
verification, correctness 
verification 
• During data auditing, 
the TPA should not 
have access to the 
user’s data content 
• Highly 
efficient in 
recovering the 
singleton 
losses 
• Recovering the 
bursty data 
losses 
 
Privacy Negotiation 
Language (PNL) 
Mechanism [62] 
• The mechanism is based on 
description logic 
• They use erasure code in file 
distribution to guarantee the 
availability 
•  Public auditing is required 
for stored data; hence the 
TPA is used 
• Does not guarantee the 
security of user privacy 
data 
• Protects the user 
data from being 
misused 
• Protects against 
Byzantine 
failures by 
dynamic data 
operation and 
server colluding 
attacks in the 
cloud 
 
 
Securing the cloud 
storage audit service 
[65] 
• Based on feedback audit 
scheme.  
• Light-weight protocol and 
for the computational audit, 
it adopts multi-TPAs 
• Three phases: Setup, release 
and execute 
• The user completes the final 
verification task 
• Processing proofs are 
required 
• Running time analysis 
should be done 
• Prevents frame 
and colluding 
attacks  
 
 
Secure Digital 
Signature Scheme 
[68] 
• This scheme utilizes Oruta 
and Knox approach, and the 
digital signature makes it 
more secure 
• Preserves the integrity of the 
shared data during the 
auditing process  
• An adversary may 
corrupt the data in the 
verification phase and 
prevent the user from 
using correct data. 
• Storage 
correctness is 
preserved when 
the cloud server 
fails to 
authenticate its 
response 
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Security Model Security Requirements Threats   Advantages 
 
Third-Party Storage 
Audit Service 
(TSAS) [70] 
• Combination of 
cryptography and the bi-
linearity properties. 
• The requirements are 
confidentiality, Dynamic 
auditing, batch auditing 
• Auditing protocol 
becomes insecure due 
to dynamic operations 
• Replay attack and 
forge attack occurs 
• Protects data 
privacy  
• Less computation 
costs 
 
Managing trust 
using TPA [72] 
 • Cloud service user 
feedback is not 
supported 
• Security strength 
is demonstrated 
to be effective 
 
 
Encryption scheme 
using TPA [73] 
 
• Trusted Third-Party based 
scheme to encrypt the cloud 
data and algorithms 
•  Uses secret key for 
communication 
• The TPA performs user 
authentication and data 
integrity 
• High communication 
overhead 
• Improved Data 
Confidentiality 
• Reduced 
Computational 
burden 
 
A Centralized trust 
model approach [78] 
• Based on a centralized model 
approach  
• Uses feedback mechanism 
from CC to obtain trust 
values  
 
• Cloud service user 
feedback cannot 
always be trusted 
• Establishes trust 
for cloud users 
• Updating 
changes in the 
server is made 
easy 
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Table 1.2. Recapitulation Based on the Key Schemes 
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SCHEME 
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SCHEME 
GENERATING 
SIGNATURE 
 
SPS [22] 
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EPASS [65]  
 
 
 
   
        
 
       
   
RSASS [67] 
 
         
      
TSAS [92]       
      
   
ESTTP[95]        
   
  
 
2.4 Discussions and Recommendations on the Studied Methods  
 
In comparing the studied schemes, our study elaborated on the below factors (Figure 2.2): 
2.4.1 Comparison factors: 
a-  Dynamic Auditing: 
As summarized in Figure 2.2, we have developed our research on the following elements: 
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• RSA based storage security supports active operation and identifies misbehaving servers 
in the cloud. However, TPA has control over the private keys, which is deemed unsafe. 
• Privacy Negotiation Mechanism protects against byzantine failures by dynamic auditing 
and server colluding attacks. However, it does not guarantee the privacy of the user’s data. 
• Privacy-preserving public auditing is highly efficient for dynamic groups, but it consumes 
more time and bandwidth to achieve high error detection probability. 
• Third-party storage audit service protects the privacy of the data, and it has less 
communication cost. In some cases, due to dynamic operations, which tend to make the 
auditing protocol insecure. 
b- Lightweight security: 
• The novel third-party auditor scheme ensures data confidentiality using encryption 
techniques leading to secure authentication. 
• Data Privacy by authenticating and secret sharing achieves mutual authentication between 
the client and the server, which reduces the information cost for secret sharing. 
c- Act as a verifier: 
• While protecting data privacy in the public cloud, the verifier is not trusted. 
• In Knox and Oruta approach, during the verification phase adversary may corrupt the data. 
2.4.2 Issues Recurring from Adopting TPA: 
a- Trust: We could reduce the computation and communication overhead by using the public 
auditing mechanism. Nonetheless, there can be a problem with internal attacks. 
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b- Access to audited data: 
• TPA achieves better efficiency while performing multiple auditing tasks using 
homomorphic non-linear authenticator and random masking techniques. However, a local 
copy of the data can be present for the TPA. 
• The data possession scheme can be used to maintain strong anonymity in the cloud 
environment. 
c- Data Redundancy: 
• In PoOR scheme, traffic cost is optimized. However, data duplication is a problem as it 
leads to data redundancy. 
• The centralized trust model approach significantly establishes the trust for cloud users, 
and makes updating changes easy. However, CC’s feedback cannot always be trusted.          
  
 
   
Figure 2.2. TPA Schemes 
As the aim of our study is to orient our efforts towards a more simplistic lightweight, and 
secure solution that will help alleviate the gap in the cloud users’ decision compromise. We will 
focus on the four most eminent solutions based on privacy-preserving to compare our proposed 
method to them. 
 
 
Security
Protocol 
 
Auditing as a
verifier 
 
Data
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Security Solutions Based on a TPA                                                         Confidentiality 
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The cloud storage is an easy and flexible platform that allows the CC to store his confidential data 
from his local computers to the servers on the cloud. Nowadays, many CCs store their sensitive 
data in the cloud; however, this platform introduces new concerns and security trials.  To overcome 
these concerns, the TPA is proposed to safeguard the sensitive data and restore the confidence of 
the CCs, but it is also expected that the TPA could be dishonest. The TPA could share confidential 
information with illegitimate parties for the sake of gaining financial benefits. Therefore, the 
purpose of our proposed method is to introduce a light-weight (in terms of processing and 
communication cost) solution, that allows the CC to have more control over the auditing process 
when a TPA is involved. 
 
3.1 System Model 
 In this section, we describe our model’s security requirements. The proposed protocol is 
constructed in a cloud computing environment. To illustrate the actual needs, we start by 
discussing the system model that helps to audit for the CC and makes the TPA accountable in front 
of the CC. As depicted in Figure 3.1, the system model supports three entities (TPA, CSP, and 
CC). 
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Figure 3.1. System Model 
 Cloud Client: It is the primary entity in our proposed approach, which is composed of 
cloud users, devices, and customers. The privacy of the client is of paramount significance 
along with the utilization of the limited storage and computing resources efficiently. The 
CC could request the TPA to audit its data while having a lack of trust in the TPA. Hence, 
the CSP issues a secret key, and a random number to the CC and the TPA explained in the 
arrows 1a and 1b respectively. Thus, the CC sends a key update request to the TPA for 
auditing process referred in (2). 
Furthermore, the CC wants to confirm whether the TPA possesses a similar secret 
key and a random number; as the CC sends a message, to TPA presented as an audit request 
message referred in (4). If the same key and random number are verified, then the TPA is 
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considered as reliable; Otherwise, the TPA is regarded as illegitimate and sharing the 
private information of the CC with someone else for personal gains. Thus, the CC wants to 
ensure that this is not happening. 
 Third-Party Auditor: It is considered as a highly trusted party. The TPA has a better 
capability of storage and computation. The performance of the TPAs is examined to 
safeguard their impartiality and fairness. 
Moreover, TPAs use their expertise to audit the data and provide the auditing result as the 
confirmation or the negation of the deceitful role of the CSP. However, the TPA could be 
malicious, and the CCs will not have enough trust in him. Thus, the CC wants to ensure 
that the TPA is not playing a malicious role during the auditing process, as explained in 
this system model. Once, The TPA receives the auditing request from CC; then, he 
establishes the audit initialization process with the CSP referred to in the message (3) to 
complete the auditing process. Furthermore, the TPA is also accountable for updating its 
key with the CC. In response, the TPA sends the key update response message as referred 
in (5).   
 Cloud Service Provider: It involves several distributed servers that offer various services 
to CCs. The CSP has unlimited resources of computation and storage. The CC enjoys cloud 
services delivered via the Internet. According to our proposed approach, the CSP is 
assumed as trustworthy and could be considered as deceitful. Thus, the CSP has been given 
the responsibility to issue the secret key and random number for both the TPA and the CC. 
Besides, this method of rendering the secret key and random number helps the CC to check 
the role of the TPA. The CSP is responsible for forwarding the auditing results to TPA 
done on it referred in (6). The CSP interacts with the TPA and CCs and initially distributes 
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its identity ′𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ and the TPA and CCs record this information. In response, the CC and 
the TPA can use 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  to calculate the secret key as follows:  
 For 𝑖𝑖 ∈  Error!  Bookmark not defined., it calculates two hash values in which 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖), 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑂1. The output gives secret key as: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Proposed LAPP Protocol – Mathematical Model 
3.2.1. Introduction 
There are several security threats to the cloud computing realm that causes damage to the 
privacy and confidentiality of the data. Hence, complete satisfaction of the CC is of paramount 
significance. In this section, we present our proposed LAPP model, which provides the 
mechanisms for preserving the data-privacy for the CC. This mechanism aims to ensure that the 
TPA should not expose or steal the CC’s private data. Our proposed solution provides that the TPA 
does not disclose the CCs data contents while auditing the out-sourced data on the cloud servers. 
This concept is significant as it prevents the issues resulting from involving the TPA in the process, 
whether they are intentional (TPA bribed by other sources) or unintentional (TPA compromised 
by attackers) [79]. The cloud storage is an easy and flexible platform that allows the CC to store 
his confidential data from his local computers to the servers on the cloud. Nowadays, many CCs 
store their sensitive data in the cloud. However, this platform introduces new concerns and security 
trials.  To overcome these concerns, the TPA is proposed to safeguard the sensitive data and restore 
the confidence of the CCs, but it is also expected that the TPA could be dishonest. The TPA could 
share confidential information with illegitimate parties for the sake of gaining financial benefits. 
Therefore, after a comprehensive survey on cloud computing, based on a TPA, homogeneity, 
dynamicity, and privacy-preserving, we concluded the need for a light-weight (in terms of 
42 
 
processing and communication cost) solution, that allows the CC to have more control on the 
auditing process when a TPA is involved. 
 We assume that Cloud Client (CC) transmits the data file ‘Df‘ with data contents ‘Dc‘ given by: 
Df = {Dc1, Dc2, Dc3, …, Dcn}   (1) 
 
Each data content has its physical significance and can be updated by the CC anytime. The CC 
can decrypt the private data contents.  
The CC encrypts the data using his private key: 
Df = PR<Dc1, Dc2, Dc3, …, Dcn>            (2) 
Therefore, private data contents are encrypted given by 
𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 = � 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=0
{𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)}                                                            (3) 
Where:  
Ekey: Encryption key. 
PR(Dci): Private data. 
Tpr: complete testing process. 
In equation (4), the CC uses its private key to encrypt the data contents. The data contents are 
further divided into sub-data contents ‘Sdc‘ which are denoted as: 
Dc = {Sdc1, Sdc2, …, Sdcn}                    (4) 
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By adopting the same concept and for the sake of making the data more secure, the sub-data 
contents Sdc are further fragmented into smaller chunks C(Sdc) explained as: 
(Sdc) = C(Sdc1), C(Sdc2), …, C(Sdcn)              (5) 
  For simplicity's sake, we only focus on single data content in our construct, and a constant 
number of small chunks for each sub-data content. We chose the maximum number of chunks 
‘M[C(Sdc)]’ from the list of small chunks as ‘C(Sdc)n.’ 
Thus, C(Sdc)n < M[C(Sdc)]. Therefore, each sub-data content Sdc has a maximum M[C(Sdc)] 
data chunks, by setting (Sdc)k = 0 for (Sdc) < k < M[C(Sdc)]. 
 
In our case, we are assuming that the size of each data chunk is persistent and equivalent to the 
security metric’γ.’ Therefore, the total of sub-data contents ‘T(Sdc)’ can be calculated by equation 
(6): 
T(Sdc) = S * Dc / {(Sdc) log γ}               (6) 
Where k: compatible data chunks and S: data content size. 
Hence, the encrypted data contents are given by: 
Dc = {[(Sdc)k} k ϵ | 1, T(Sdc) |, k ϵ | 1, C(Sdc) |            (7) 
The multiple encryptions are used that leads to higher security. The significance of using 
multiple encryptions is to address those problems which mostly doesn’t exist visibly but can be 
resolved using multiple encryptions. 
Let bilinear map be used so that Z1, Z2, and Zx are the multiplicative groups with identical prime 
order e and p. The bilinear creates the relationship between cryptographic groups. 
Thus, the bilinear map can be expressed as Zx  Z1 x Z2 and their generators are z1 and z2 ϵ Zp. 
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z1 ϵ Z1. 
z2 ϵ Z2. 
e, p ϵ Zp. 
f: Z1 x Z2   Zx   where f (z1e, z2p) = f (z1, z2) ep 
Let f(h): {0,1) *  Z1 be the secure hash function that is mapped with data contents Dc for the point 
Z1. 
We are using a hash function with a Boolean output. The purpose is to map the data to secure 
our system further, as by definition hash functions take in its input data with different sizes and 
will have an output data with a fixed size. 
Our Light-weight Accountable Privacy-Preserving Protocol (LAPP) involves the following 
procedures: 
 Key Generation 
 Key Update 
 Label Generation 
 Testing process 
 Substantiation process 
 Validation process  
3.2.1. Key Generation 
 
   Since we have subdivided the data into multiple sub-chunks, and to reassemble the data correctly, 
we are issuing labels for every sub-chunk created. The key generation process involves the security 
parameter ‘β’ that is based on two random numbers γ1 and γ2; for the secret hash key (for the data) 
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and secret label key (for the labels) respectively. It can be expressed as γ1, γ2 ϵ Zp. Thus, the secret 
label key output ‘Sko’ can be determined as: 
 Sko = z2γ2 ϵ Z2                     (8) 
   The CSP performs the key-generation process; And the authentication is initiated by the CC, as 
described in algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1: Key-Generation and authentication process  
 
1. Initialization: (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝: Cloud service provider;𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘: Secret key; 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐: Cloud Client; 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅: 
Random number; 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝: Third-party auditor; 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠: Cloud Server; 𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟: Key Request; 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉: 
Valid Client) 
2. Input: (𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟) 
3. Output: (𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘; 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) 
4. Set 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 & 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∈  𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠   
5. 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 makes 𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 
6. Check 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 into 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠   
7. If 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 then 
8. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 releases 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘& 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 to 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 & 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
9. 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬  Denied 𝐾𝐾𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 to 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 
10. 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 
11. End-Elseif 
 
    Algorithm-1 describes the key-generation process when the CC intends for audit. In this 
algorithm, the CSP is considered as a reliable and trustworthy entity. In step-1, the initialization 
of variables is given. In steps 2-3, the input and the output processes are defined respectively. In 
step-4, the secret key and random numbers are stored for each client on the cloud server that is 
assigned to the CC based on the given request. Step-5 shows the key request process done by the 
CC when intending to audit. Once the request is received by the CSP; it starts checking the validity 
of the CC into the cloud server shown in steps 6-7. If the CC is found as a valid client, the CSP 
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releases the secret key and a random number to the CC and the TPA as described in step 8. If the 
CC is not registered with a given cloud server, then the request for obtaining the keys is denied. 
3.2.2. Key update 
 
Since each generated key requires updates, without the key update, there is a chance of a 
compromise on the generated key. 
Theorem 1:  The proposed agreement is evident for CCs. 
Proof: During the keyGen process, CCs can examine the legitimacy of the key updates with the 
help of open keys and parameters from the CSP. In other words, after the CSP makes the clients' 
secret keys up to date, using open keys and parameters, the clients can check if the CSP’s secured 
keys have been refreshed. Based on this, the proposed plan supports the key updates’ obviousness 
for customers. 
Theorem 2: The Proposed agreement is responsible for the period of key updates. 
Proof: During the key updates, the hash estimation of the encoded key is built by an absolute 
counter estimation Ti. Hence, from the above presentation of key updates, the actual counter is a 
calculation of the prior encoded key and counter. Therefore, in the process of actual key generation, 
customers can check the present counter against the past counter. If the current counter is equal or 
less than the prior counter, it can be inferred that the TPA has refreshed the prior key. 
3.2.3. Label Generation 
 
Since we have issued labels for all the data sub-chunks, the label generation is implemented in 
a way that prevents the injection of invalid data in the system and to mitigate any vulnerability of 
the system that could be introduced through the label generation. This process involves data 
contents ‘Dc’ that encloses the secret hash key ‘γ1’ and the secret label key ‘γ2’. As ‘γ1’ and ‘γ2’ 
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are used as inputs. The small chunks ‘C(Sdc)’ require random values, as illustrated in equation 
(11): 
C(Sdc) = {τ1, τ2, τ3, …, τC(Sdc)}] ϵ Zp             (9) 
 
Once the random values are chosen, the computing process ‘Ck’ is initiated as Ck = z1τk ϵ Z1 for 
all k ϵ [1, C(Sdc)]. Thus, for each data contents (Sdc)k (k ϵ [1, C(Sdc)], the data label dlj is 
determined by: 
𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 = {𝐸𝐸(ℎ)(𝛾𝛾1, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ǁ 𝑗𝑗)} ∗ � 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘}𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐)
𝑘𝑘=1
                                   (10) 
  
Labels are a vital part, and data labels require to be updated automatically. Therefore, the 
complete set of data labels can be obtained from the data contends by substituting the 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗. S(dtj) = [(dlj)j ∈ {1, C(Sdc)}] 
𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗) = �(f(h)(𝛾𝛾1, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ‖ 𝑗𝑗) ∗ � 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐)
𝑘𝑘=1
)𝛾𝛾2 � 𝑗𝑗 ∈  [1, 𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)]   (11) 
Where j: label number for each data content; did: data identifier; S(dtj): complete set of data 
labels. 
3.2.4. Testing process 
 
This section describes the first step in the overall validation of our method. The idea is to work 
on a sample of the data contents Dci, then generalize the method to the overall data. Hence, few 
samples of data contents are chosen to build the testing process ‘Tpr‘and generate random number 
‘Rn.’ Thus, it can be written as Rn ϵ Zp* for selected data contents (Dc) k {j ϵ Tpr}. We calculate 
the testing process sample ‘Tps‘as Tps = {Tpr}Rn by using a random number. Therefore, the 
complete testing process Tpr* can be obtained as: 
Tpr* = {(j, Rn), jϵ Tpr, Tps}                      (12) 
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3.2.5. Substantiation Process 
 
This phase is called “the substantiation process” as it gives more details of the testing with specifics 
to the data contents ‘Ʈ’ and the generated labels ‘Ψ.’ This process gets the data contents as inputs 
and then applies to them the complete testing process Tpr*. Hence the process encompasses the 
label substantiation ‘Ψ’ and the data content substantiation ‘Ʈ.’  
Thus, the label substantiation can be generated by:  
𝛹𝛹 = � 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑘𝑘∈𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
                                                             (13) 
        
The small data chunks of all tested data contents {T(Dc)} are first calculated for generating the 
tested data content substantiation for each k ϵ [1, C(Sdc)] given by: 
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) = � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐)                                          (14) 
The data content substantiation process can be obtained as 
Ʈ =  𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) ×  𝛹𝛹 
By substituting the values of all tested data contents and label substantiation to obtain the data 
content substantiation process by equation (17) 
Ʈ = � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) � × � 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘∈𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                       (15) 
3.2.6. Validation Process 
 
After applying our testing methodology to the labels and the data contents (substantiation 
phase), in this phase, we are implementing a method to check whether or not the TPA has tampered 
the data contents. We proceed by applying the complete testing process Tpr*,  
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data content substantiation process Ʈ, secret hash key γ1, the secret label key Sko, a sample 
of the data contents 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, as inputs. The identifier hash function f(ℎ𝑖𝑖) is calculated first as f(ℎ𝑖𝑖) = {Tpr∗ + 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 +  Ʈ + γ1(𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾𝑜𝑜)}                          (16) 
 
Based on the given identifier hash function, we need to determine tested hash function f(ℎ𝑡𝑡) 
for all tested data contents and calculation of tested hash f(ht) given by: f(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) + f(ℎ𝑖𝑖) 
Substitution of tested data contents 𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) & the identifier hash function f(ℎ𝑖𝑖)   
f(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = �� � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) � + {(j, Rn), jϵ Tpr, Tps} + � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) �
+  � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) � × � 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘∈𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +  γ1(z2γ2 ϵ Z2)�          (17) 
Since the hash function, defined earlier, f(h) has a Boolean output, the validation process could 
be determined by 
 
{ Data contents not tampered by TPA    if    Ʈ. 𝜀𝜀{f(ℎ𝑡𝑡), 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜} = 1} 
{ Data contents tampered by TPA    if    Ʈ. 𝜀𝜀{f(ℎ𝑡𝑡), 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜} = 0  } 
 
After determining the tampering process done by TPA, the possible validation process can be 
obtained by: 
50 
 
Ʈ. 𝜀𝜀{f(ℎ𝑡𝑡), 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜} =  � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) �
× � 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑘𝑘∈𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
��� � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) � + {(j, Rn), jϵ Tpr, Tps} + � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) �
+  � � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘
𝑇𝑇(𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐) � × � 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘∈𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 +  γ1(z2γ2 ϵ Z2)� , z2γ2 ϵ Z2 �   (18)  
Where ε is a small positive value. 
 
In this section, the validation of the malicious role of the TPA is described in algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2: Validation of the malicious role of TPA 
 
1. Initialization: {𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝: Cloud service provider; 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘: Secret key; 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐: Cloud Client; 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅: Random number; 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟: Audit Request; 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝: Third party auditor; 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠: Cloud 
Server; 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟: Key Update Request; 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠: Key Update Response; 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙: Third 
party auditor legitimate; 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖: Third party auditor illegitimate} 
2. Input: {𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟} 
3. Output: { 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙; 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖}  
4. 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐  →  𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
5. Initiate 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  → 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 
6. Set 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 →  𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
7. 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 →  𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐  
8. 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 Checks if 𝐾𝐾𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 =  𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 & 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 then 
9. 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 =  𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙 
10. 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  
11. 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 
12. End Elseif 
 
   Algorithm-2 determines the malicious activity of TPA. In step-1, the initialization process is 
described. Steps 2-3 show the input and output processes, respectively. In steps-4-5, the CC 
initiates the request for the auditing process to the TPA. Once, the TPA receives the solicitation of 
auditing; then it starts the auditing process. 
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On the other hand, the CC does not have trust in the TPA, so it wants to send a key update request 
to ensure that TPA has similar keys shown in step-6. Once, the TPA receives the key update 
request; if it is a legitimate TPA, then it sends the key update response to the CC as described in 
step-7. When the CC receives the key update response from the TPA, then it checks whether the 
response with a secret key and a random number matches, then the TPA is declared as legitimate; 
Otherwise, the TPA is considered as illegitimate (please refer to steps 8-10). 
4. Privacy-Preserving Polynomial Model Generation 
 
In this section, we use the Chebyshev polynomials to demonstrate the effectiveness of our 
introduced method (LAPP) mathematically. 
Consider a dataset {(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)| ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑅𝑅}, and let  
   𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑎𝑎1𝜑𝜑1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑎𝑎2𝜑𝜑2(𝑥𝑥) + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝜑𝜑𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥)   (19) 
 
where,  𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 are coefficients and 𝜑𝜑1(𝑥𝑥), 𝜑𝜑2(𝑥𝑥), … , 𝜑𝜑𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) are Chebyshev polynomials of 
the first kind,  
𝜑𝜑1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇0(𝑥𝑥) = 1 
     𝜑𝜑2(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥 
𝜑𝜑𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅+1(𝑥𝑥) = 2𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅−1(𝑥𝑥) 
 
Assume that the data {𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖}, are chosen from an interval [𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽]. The Chebyshev polynomials can be 
modified as:  
𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘−1 �2𝑥𝑥 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼 �                                                                 (20) 
 
52 
 
The approximated function 𝐸𝐸 of degree (𝑚𝑚 − 1) can be given by Equation (21), where the degree 
of (𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘) is 𝑘𝑘 − 1. We will assume the interval [𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽] = [0,1] and construct the model accordingly. 
According to Equation (22) when [𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽] = [0,1], we get Equation (22) 
 
𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘−1 �2𝑥𝑥 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼 � = 𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘−1(2𝑥𝑥 − 1)                                     (21) 
 
We can obtain the following equations for 𝑚𝑚 = 4. 
 
𝜑𝜑1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇0(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) = 1 
 
𝜑𝜑2(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇1(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) = 2𝑥𝑥 − 1 
 
𝜑𝜑3(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) = 8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1 
 
𝜑𝜑4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑇𝑇3(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) = 32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1 
 
To determine the 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) when 𝑚𝑚 − 4. 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑎𝑎1𝜑𝜑1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑎𝑎2𝜑𝜑2(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑎𝑎3𝜑𝜑3(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑎𝑎4𝜑𝜑4(𝑥𝑥)                           (22) 
𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑎𝑎1(1) + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) 
 
Let the actual input be 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1 to 𝑅𝑅. The error of the approximated input can be determined 
by Equation (25) 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖                                                                                         (23) 
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We need to determine the values of 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, and 𝑎𝑎4, we use the root mean square error. 
 
𝐸𝐸 = �1
𝑅𝑅
��𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�2𝑅𝑅
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Let’s take the least-squares fitting of 𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) of the class of functions 𝐶𝐶 which minimizes 𝐸𝐸 as 
𝐸𝐸 ∗� (𝑥𝑥) 
We can obtain 𝐸𝐸 ∗ (𝑥𝑥) by minimizing 𝐸𝐸. Thus, we seek to minimize 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4) which is 
given in Equation (26) 
 
𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4) = �[𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖]2𝑅𝑅
𝑖𝑖=1
(24) 
 
The values of 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, and 𝑎𝑎4 that minimize 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4) will satisfy the expressions given 
from equations 27-30. 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4)
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1
= 𝜕𝜕(∑ [𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖]2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖=1 )
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1
= 0  (25) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4)
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2
= 𝜕𝜕(∑ [𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖]2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖=1 )
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2
= 0  (26) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4)
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎3
= 𝜕𝜕(∑ [𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖]2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖=1 )
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎3
= 0  (27) 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, 𝑎𝑎4)
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎4
= 𝜕𝜕(∑ [𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎2(2𝑥𝑥 − 1) + 𝑎𝑎3(8𝑥𝑥2 − 8𝑥𝑥 + 1) + 𝑎𝑎4(32𝑥𝑥3 − 48𝑥𝑥2 + 18𝑥𝑥 − 1) − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖]2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖=1 )
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎4
= 0  (28) 
 
The summary of the used notations is given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3-1  Naming Convention 
Symbol/Function Details 
Df data file 
Dci data contents 
Sdci sub-data contents 
C(Sdci) smaller chunks of sub-data contents 
M[C(Sdc)] the maximum of data chunks 
T(Sdc) total sub data contents 
γ security metric 
k compatible data chunks 
S data content size 
f(h) secure hash function 
z1 and z2 key generators  
β  security parameter consisting of two random numbers γ1 and γ2 
γ1 secret hash key 
γ2 secret label key 
Sk0 secret label key output 
τ1 random number 
did data identifier 
dlj data label 
S(dtj) complete set of data labels 
Ck computing process 
A(Dc) data content abstract information 
Tpr* complete testing process 
Ψ the label substantiation  
Rn random number 
Ʈ data content substantiation 
ε small positive value 
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3.2.7 Mathematical Model Diagram 
 Figure 3.2 recapitulates the main steps of our proposed model. 
 
Figure 3.2. Mathematical Model Diagram 
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CHAPTER 4: ALGORITHMS 
Our proposed solution is based on three main algorithms that will be detailed below: 
• Key Validation process to avoid the malicious role of the TPA. 
• The key-extraction process of three stakeholders. 
• Detecting the malicious activity of third party auditor and Cloud service provider. 
Our assumptions are as follows: these proposed algorithms will not serve to replace the existing 
security algorithms used by the cloud, but rather serve as an extra layer to give additional tools to 
the CC to be able to have a way to verify on the auditing process. 
4.1 Key Validation process to avoid the malicious role of TPA 
Algorithm 3: Key Validation process to prevent the malicious role of the TPA 
 
1. Initialization: (gk: Guarantee of the key; sk: Secret key; Atest: Auditor testing 
process; Ares: Service provider response; CC:  Cloud Client; p: prime number, Rn: 
Random number, and V: validation) Input: Dc 
2. Input: (gk; sk; Atest; Rn; p)  
3. Output: (Ares ; CSPres; V) 
4. Pick Rn such that 1 < Rn < p 
5. Compute gRn// Group of random numbers 
6. CC initiates Atest 
7. Set   Atest = gRn 
8. CC computes CSPres = gRn.K 
9. CSPres  CC: gRn.K 
10. CC computes Atest = (gk)Rn 
11. CC checks if Atest = gRn.K then 
12. CC confirms successful V 
13. else if CC determines the malicious activity of TPA 
14. End if 
15. End else if 
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The goal of this algorithm is to validate the key presented by the TPA when initiating the audit 
process: 
• From lines 1-3, we explain the initialization, input, and output processes, respectively.  
• In line 4, random number is picked that should be greater than 1 and less than a prime 
number. 
• In line 5, we compute the group of random numbers.  
• From lines 6-7, Cloud client starts the testing process for the auditor, and we set the group 
of random numbers for the testing process.  
• In line 8, the cloud client computes the service provider’s response against a group of the 
secret keys and random numbers; as a group of a random number including secret keys 
must be matched with the list of cloud client’s random numbers.  
• In line 9, the cloud service provider sends its response to the cloud client to confirm the 
group of secret keys including the random numbers.  
• On line 10, cloud client computes the testing process that should be encrypted using secret 
keys inclusive random numbers.  
• In lines 11-13, the cloud client checks if the auditing testing process meets the criteria of 
the random number and secret keys issued by the cloud service provider are same as third 
party auditor (TPA) presents for auditing then, cloud client confirms the successful key 
validation process. If the criteria are not met, then the cloud client determines the existence 
of a TPA’s malicious activity. 
 
4. 2 The key-extraction process of three stakeholders 
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Algorithm 4: Key-Extraction process of three stakeholders 
 
1. Initialization: (gRs : Group of Random shared key; CSP: Cloud service provider; 
Sk: Secret key; Bk: Blinded key; CC:  Cloud Client; p: prime number; Rs: Random 
shared key; TPA: Third Party Auditor; and T: trusted party) 
2. Input: (gRs; CSP; Sk; T) 
3. Output: (TPA; Bk) 
4. CC &CSP use Rs 
5. Set 1<Rs<p && TPA knows gRs &&  gRs ϵ T 
6. CSP TPA : Bk = Rs + Sk mod p 
7. TPA examines gBk if gRs gSk = g Rs + Sk mod p then 
8. Set gBk = g Rs + Sk mod p 
9. Elseif gRs gSk ≠ g Rs + Sk mod p then 
10. Set CSP ∄ gBk  
11. Endif 
12. End else-if 
13. TPA  CC ϵ Bk 
14. CC computes Bk - Rs = Sk mod p if CC = Bk  then 
15. Set TPA = CC 
16. endif 
 
 
The goal of this algorithm is to ensure the three stakeholders (Cloud Client, Cloud Service 
Provider, and Third-Party Auditor) are using the same keys as issued by the trusted party: 
• From lines 1-3, we explain the used parameter-initialization, input, and output processes 
respectively.  
• In line 4, cloud service providers and cloud clients use the secret random shared key.  
• In the line 5, we set the value of the secret random shared key more than one and less than the 
prime number. Furthermore, the trusted party is responsible for issuing the group of random 
shared keys for the three stakeholders.  
• In line 6, the cloud service provider issues the blinded key to the third-party auditor.  
• In lines 7-10, third party auditor examines the group of blinded-key if they are same that are 
already available with the cloud service provider. If the group of secret keys, including random 
59 
 
shared keys, is similar to that of blinded key, then it is proved that both entities (cloud service 
provider and third-party auditor) are possessing the same keys for authentication. If a group of 
secret keys including random shared keys is not identical with that of blinded-key, then it is 
proved that cloud service provider does not have valid keys that should match with a group of 
blinded keys.  
• In line 11-13, Third-party auditor also checks the blinded-key with cloud client. Hence, the 
cloud client computes the key, and if the key of the cloud client matches the key of the third-
party auditor, then it is declared that both parties have the same keys. 
 
4. 3 Detecting the malicious activity of TPA and CSP 
Algorithm 5: Detecting the malicious activity of third-party auditor and Cloud service 
provider 
 
1. Initialization: (f(h): Hash function; CSP: Cloud service provider; Ken: Encrypted 
key; Dc: Data contents; CC:  Cloud client; TPA: Third party auditor; O(Ds):  
Original data service; Ma: Malicious) 
2. Input: ( Dc ) 
3. Output: (Ma) 
4. CSP assigns Ken to TPA & CC 
5. TPA audits {f(h) Ken ( Dc )} ϵ CC 
6. If {f(h) Ken ( Dc )} ϵ CC = O(Ds) then 
7. CSP ϵ h otherwise Ma 
8. Endif 
9. CC  TPA: {f(h) Ken ( Dc )}  
10. If{f(h) Ken ( Dc )} = O(Ds) then 
11. TPA ϵ h otherwise Ma 
12. Endif 
 
  
This algorithm aims to detect the malicious activities of the cloud service provider as well as the 
third-party auditor as he/she audits the data contents of the cloud client. 
This algorithm consists of two phases: 
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• In the first phase, the TPA audits if the CSP is malicious or not. 
• In the second phase, the CC audits whether the TPA is malicious or not. 
The algorithm steps are as follows: 
• From lines 1-3, we describe the parameter-initialization, input, and output processes, 
respectively.  
• In line 4, the cloud service provider assigns the encrypted key to the third-party auditor and 
the cloud client. As, the third-party auditor uses this key to audit the encrypted contents of the 
cloud data user, while the cloud client uses the key to access the cloud and detect the malicious 
activity of the third-party auditor when auditing the data contents.  
• In lines 5-7, the third-party auditor checks the services provided to cloud client from the cloud 
service provider. The cloud client presents its encrypted data contents to inspect and determine 
the role of the cloud service provider. If the data contents submitted by the cloud client match 
with provided service from the cloud service provider, then the cloud service provider is 
considered as honest otherwise the cloud service provider is regarded as malicious (dishonest). 
• From lines 9-11, the role of the third-party auditor has checked whether it is honest or doing a 
malicious activity with the data contents. 
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CHAPTER 5: SIMULATION SETUP AND EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
To confirm the performance of the proposed Light-weight Accountable Privacy-Preserving 
(LAPP) protocol, we have developed the LAPP using the C++ programming language and 
integrated into the GreenCloud simulator. The GreenCloud is run on the IBM z13 to obtain quick 
and realistic outcomes. We generated several scenarios that were almost identical to the real 
environment. The used parameters are described in Table 5.1 and are for testing purposes. 
5.1 Simulation Parameters 
Table 5.1 Simulation Parameters  
Parameters Details 
Number of chassis switches at L4 1920 
Line cards at L4 1630 
Ports at L4 72 
Number of racks at L4 16 
Number of chassis switches at L3 432 
Line cards at L3 164 
Ports at L3 48 
Number of racks at L3 128 
Used virtual machines 1800 
Number of Servers 64 
Maximum number of Cloud Service Users 18000 
Hosts in each rack 132 
Each Host supports 16 processors 
Memory with each processor 256 GB 
Storage Memory 512 GB 
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5.2 Simulations  
 
We have elaborated on all simulations with malicious attempts rates at 1%, 2% and 5% 
malicious TPA activities [80]. All simulation results showed a superiority in performance for our 
proposed LAPP. In our simulation, we have proceeded with the following measurements:  
• Communication Cost vs. Block Size 
• Auditing Time per Task vs. Fraction of Invalid Responses 
• Reliable Auditing Detection vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users 
• Computation time on Auditing vs. Number of Challenged Data Blocks 
• Accuracy vs. Number of Malicious Attempts 
• Time complexity vs. Input Files 
• Processing time vs. Volume of Data 
• Average Auditing Time of each Service User vs. Number of Clients 
For each simulation, we will present four graphs corresponding to 0%, 1%, 2% and 5% 
malicious rates, and we will give the interpretation of the results for the 2% rate ones. 
Parameters Details 
Virtual Disk Memory 430 GB 
Bandwidth for L4 256 GB/Sec 
Bandwidth for L3 128 GB/Sec 
Bandwidth for L2 64 GB/Sec 
Bandwidth for L1 16 GB/Sec 
Queue delay 0.005 Seconds 
Burst time 0.0056 Seconds 
Idle time 0.0032 Seconds 
Packet Size 1260  
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5.2.1 Communication Cost Vs. Block Size 
In this simulation, as depicted in figures 5.1 – 5.4, we measure the communication cost 
while increasing the audited data’s block size from 0 to 900 KB. At 900 KB, the simulation 
result shows 830 KB while other methods show a fluctuation between 1100 KB and 1250 KB. 
 
Figure 5.1. Communication Cost Vs. Block Size (0% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.2. Communication Cost Vs. Block Size (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.3. Communication Cost Vs. Block Size (2% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Communication Cost Vs. Block Size (5% Ma) 
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5.2.2. Auditing Time per Task Vs. Fraction of Invalid Responses 
In this simulation, as depicted in figures 5.5 – 5.8, we measure the auditing time per task 
in milliseconds in comparison with the fraction of invalid responses; increasing by five on each 
occurrence. When the fraction of invalid responses reaches 45, the simulation showed a result 
of 560 ms for LAPP, while all other methods show a fluctuation between 590 ms and 645 ms. 
 
Figure 5.5. Auditing Time per Task Vs. the Fraction of Invalid Responses (0% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.6. Auditing Time per Task Vs. the Fraction of Invalid Responses (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.7. Auditing Time per Task Vs. the Fraction of Invalid Responses (2% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Auditing Time per Task Vs. the Fraction of Invalid Responses (5% Ma) 
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5.2.3 Reliable Auditing Detection Vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users 
 As depicted in figures 5.9 – 5.12, we measure the percentage of reliable auditing detection 
(verifying the effectiveness and security of the CSP’s controls and methods employed on the CC’s 
data) with some cloud auditing users. We took the measurements by increasing the number of 
cloud auditing users by 10,000 each time. At a malicious rate of 2%, The LAPP is showing around 
99.75% reliability measurement while showing a fluctuation of the other methods we have 
compared our results to, between 99.58% and 99.46%. 
 
Figure 5.9. Reliable Auditing Detection Vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users (0% Ma) 
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Figure 5.10. Reliable Auditing Detection Vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users (1% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Reliable Auditing Detection Vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users (2% Ma) 
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Figure 5.12. Reliable Auditing Detection Vs. Number of Cloud Auditing Users (5% Ma) 
5.2.4 Computation Time on Auditing Vs. the Number of Challenged Data Blocks 
In this experiment, as depicted in figures 5.13 – 5.16, we measure the computation time on 
auditing in seconds versus the number of challenged blocks. We proceed from measurement to 
measurement by increasing the number of challenged blocks by 500. Our results show that at 4500 
challenged blocks the computation time on auditing for LAPP is about 2.25 seconds. While for the 
other methods, it varies between 2.9 and 3.25 seconds. 
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Figure 5.13. Computation time on Auditing (Number of Challenged Blocks) (0% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Computation time on Auditing (Number of Challenged Blocks) (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.15. Computation time on Auditing (Number of Challenged Blocks) (2% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.16. Computation time on Auditing (Number of Challenged Blocks) (5% Ma) 
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5.2.5 Accuracy Vs. the Number of Malicious Attempts 
In this simulation, as depicted in figures 5.17 – 5.20, we measure the accuracy in 
percentage versus the number of malicious attempts, by increasing the number of malicious 
attempts by 3 for every measurement. Our results show that LAPP’s accuracy at 99.98% at 27 
malicious attempts while the other methods decrease between 99.46% and 99.58%. 
 
Figure 5.17. Accuracy (Number of Malicious Attempts) (0% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.18. Accuracy (Number of Malicious Attempts) (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.19. Accuracy (Number of Malicious Attempts) (2% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.20. Accuracy (Number of Malicious Attempts) (5% Ma) 
 
74 
 
5.2.6 Time complexity Vs. Input Files 
In this experiment, as depicted in figures 5.21 – 5.24, we measure the time complexity in 
seconds versus the size of input files in KB. We proceed from measurement to measurement by 
increasing the size of the input files by 4 KB. The order of complexity is depicted in terms of 
the big-O notation. The simulation results show a linear increase for LAPP, logarithmic increase 
for SEPPA, and PPA; and quadratic time complexity for PPPAS and SPS. 
 
 
Figure 5.21. Time Complexity (Input Files) (0% Ma) 
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Figure 5.22. Time Complexity (Input Files) (1% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.23. Time Complexity (Input Files) (2% Ma) 
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Figure 5.24. Time Complexity (Input Files) (5% Ma) 
 
5.2.7 Time Vs. Total Number of Data 
Figures 5.25 – 5.28 illustrate the change in the needed processing time versus the volume 
of the processed data, adding 5 MB of data at a time. The simulation results show that LAPP 
requires less processing time than the method it has been compared against, as we progress in time. 
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Figure 4. Time (Total Number of Data) (0% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.26. Time (Total Number of Data) (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.27. Time (Total Number of Data) (2% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.28. Time (Total Number of Data) (5% Ma) 
5.2.8 The Average Auditing Time Vs. the Number of Clients 
Figures 5.29 – 5.32 illustrate the advancement in the average auditing time for each CC 
versus the number of the CCs in the system, adding 2000 CCs at a time. The simulation 
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results show that a drop in the average auditing time when we have 8000 users then kept 
around the same average while increasing the number of users up to18000 showing 
superiority to the other methods it has been compared to. 
 
Figure 5.29. The Average Auditing Time (Number of Clients) (0% Ma) 
 
Figure 5.30. The Average Auditing Time (Number of Clients) (1% Ma) 
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Figure 5.31. The Average Auditing Time (Number of Clients) (2% Ma) 
 
 
Figure 5.32. The Average Auditing Time (Number of Clients) (5% Ma) 
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5.3 Interpretation of the Results 
 
Based on our newly introduced mathematical model and algorithms, we have proposed a 
novel model consisting of a secure validation of the keys between the tree stakeholders (CSP, 
CC, and TPA) allowing us to have an on the fly auditing as we are processing the data. 
In the first simulation, we have measured the communication cost depending on the block 
size up to 900 KB, increasing the block size by 100 each time. Our results showed a noticeable 
lower computation cost compared to the other methods to which we have compared our results.  
In our second simulation, we have measured the auditing time per task, mainly auditing the 
CSP services and policy violations [2], compared to the fraction of invalid responses (the 
percentage of the invalid responses compared to the valid ones), and the results showed a shorter 
average of 50 ms to 80 ms depending on the methods we have compared our results to. 
In our third simulation, we have measured the percentage of reliable auditing detection for 
up to 90000 cloud auditing users, incrementing the number of users by 10000 for each 
measurement. The simulation results showed a better reliability measurement for LAPP compared 
to the other methods that we have involved in our simulations. 
In our fourth simulation, we measure the computation time on auditing in seconds versus 
the number of challenged blocks. We proceed from measurement to measurement by increasing 
the number of challenged blocks by 500. Our results also showed better computation time on 
auditing for our introduced method. 
In our fifth simulation, we measure the accuracy in percentage versus the number of 
malicious attempts, by increasing the number of malicious attempts by three for every 
measurement. Our results showed a better accuracy for LAPP. 
In our sixth simulation, we measure the time complexity in seconds versus the size of input 
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files in KB. We proceed from measurement to measurement by increasing the size of the input 
files by 4 KB. We depict the order of complexity in terms of the big-O notation. The simulation 
results show a linear increase for LAPP, logarithmic increase for SEPPA, and PPA; and quadratic 
time complexity for PPPAS and SPS. 
In our seventh simulation, we measure the change in the needed processing time versus the 
volume of the processed data, adding 5 MB of data at a time. The simulation results show that 
LAPP requires less processing time than the methods it has been compared against, as we progress 
in time. 
In our last simulation, we measure the advancement in the average auditing time for each 
CC versus the number of the CCs in the system, adding 2000 CCs at a time. The simulation 
results show a drop in the average auditing time when we have 8000 users then kept around 
the same average while increasing the number of users up to 18000, showing superiority to 
the other methods to which we compare LAPP. 
These results show the efficiency of our proposed method (LAPP) as well as the 
optimization in reducing the processing and communication overheads as well as a better quality 
of service.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, we have studied cloud security based on a Third-Party Auditor (TPA). 
The TPA’s role in cloud computing is to assure the auditing function on behalf of the Cloud Client 
(CC) and to validate the security of the connection while guaranteeing the integrity of the data. 
Nonetheless, there are some issues primarily related to trust that could emerge from involving a 
TPA. Many research papers addressing security using a TPA and proposing solutions have been 
elaborated and published. 
Our study reveals the significant impact brought in by the TPA’s adoption in securing cloud 
computing, as adopting a solution with a TPA can come with trust concerns, extra overhead, 
security, and data manipulation breaches.  
In this dissertation, we have oriented our efforts towards developing a more simplistic 
lightweight, and secure solution that will help alleviate the gap in the CC’s decision and to increase 
the trust in adopting a resolution based on a TPA. Allowing the CC to audit the TPA and the CSP 
for malicious activities. Hence, we have introduced the Light-weight Accountable Privacy-
Preserving protocol (LAPP).  
LAPP’s primary function is to assure a smooth “auditing of the auditor” process. We 
have obtained our simulation results with the introduction of 0%, 1%, 2%, and 5% malicious 
TPA activities. The results demonstrated the superiority of the LAPP method versus other 
protocols against which it was compared. 
LAPP allows the CC to audit the TPA and the CSP for malicious activities, which 
increases the confidence and the willingness of more companies to embrace the cloud realm. 
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LAPP is also positioned to increase trust and grant more control to the CC to timely 
detect issues, and to take practical actions by introducing a malicious-detection algorithm that 
enables both parties to keep a check and balance on each other.  
Our simulation results demonstrated LAPP assurance to the following: 
• Expending a minimum overhead while successfully issuing the secret key to the three 
stakeholders (CSP, CC, and TPA).  
• Determining and avoiding the malicious role of the TPA, if any, with a lightweight and 
straightforward algorithm.  
• Guaranteeing a more secure communication at a minimum communication-cost.  
• Accurately detecting malicious activities.  
• Improving the Quality-of-Service (QoS) provision, mainly determined through our time 
complexity simulation results. 
In our future work, we are planning to apply LAPP on different sizes of networks to see 
its effect on small to medium systems.  
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